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Abstract 
On the basis of a longitudinal administrative dataset(1991-2002) merged with the Census of 2001 
and the National Register, the majority of the poor elderly in Belgium appear to be persistently 
poor.  The question arises why this might be so.  To the extent that individual characteristics such 
as low abilities persist over time, they may also be the reason that individuals persist in poverty 
over  time.    In  that  case,  one  expects  that  once  individual  characteristics  are  controlled  for, 
duration dependence in poverty becomes spurious.  The alternative possibility is that poverty 
experience has a causal impact on future poverty.  This may be because of a poverty trap: people 
may be given an incentive not to work while at the same time they slip into poverty.  Or this may 
be due to depreciation of human capital or loss of motivation.  The reasons for dependence in 
poverty are of interest for developing effective poverty reducing measures since true dependence 
would suggest to focus on stigma and adverse work incentives while spurious dependence would 
suggest to change individual’s characteristics. The simultaneous estimation of a multiple-spell 
discrete-time hazard model of transitions in and out of poverty, that allows for unobserved effects 
and  a  significant  initial  condition  problem,  lends  strong  empirical  support  for  true  duration 
dependence in poverty. 
This suggestion sounds reasonable since in Belgium elderly unemployed are exempted from the 
search for a job and thus easily exposed to depreciation of human capital and employers are 
reluctant to invest in the human capital of older workers.  In addition  in Belgium both employers 
and the government design retirement pathways that give elderly strong incentives to leave the 
labour market as soon as possible.   
 
Keywords: poverty dynamics; poverty persistence; early retirement; work disincentives; multiple 
spell discrete-time hazard model 
JEL codes: J14; J26; C41; I32 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
OECD studies
1 and other studies
2 argued several times that working is an effective means 
of staying out of poverty.  At a first glance this seems difficult to reconcile with the fact 
that  most  OECD  countries  designed  social  security  systems  that  strongly  encourage 
                                                 
1 OECD(2005a), OECD(2005b), OECD Jobs Strategy(1994), OECD(1997), Förster(2000), Casey- 
Yamada(2002). 
2 On the basis of EU-SILC(2004-2005), Zaidi et al.(2006): “We also find that a large proportion of elderly 
have a high risk of persistent poverty. This can be true by default, since the elderly have little opportunities 
to enhance their income position in post-retirement life. Thus, the most effective policy intervention to 
enhance incomes of the elderly will be to increase incentives to work.”  See also Bardasi-Jenkins-
Rigg(2000) for the UK. 
    2
elderly to stop working as soon as possible
3.  Given the fact that youth unemployment is 
left unaffected by early retirement of older workers
4 and that early retirement threatens 
the financial sustainability of social security systems, it becomes hard to understand why 
the Belgian government continues to encourage early retirement, especially if the latter 
would increase the risk of poverty among those who retire early.   
 
We  try  to  verify  whether  there  is  empirical  support  for  the  idea  that  adverse  work 
incentives in social security systems might push elderly in a poverty trap.  This means 
that people may be given an incentive not to work while at the same time they slip into 
poverty.   
 
One does not deny that early retirement may be the result of unfavourable labour demand 
and be perceived as an involuntary forced
5 choice by the individual, “an offer he cannot 
refuse”.  On the contrary.  But this does not impede that the individual may at the same 
time have an incentive not to look for a job or become demotivated and discouraged.  The 
question to be analysed is whether duration dependence in poverty among elderly that are 
retiring  from  the  labour  force  is  true  or  spurious.    To  the  extent  that  individual 
characteristics like low abilities or unfavourable attitudes persist over time, they may also 
be the reason that individuals persist in poverty over time.  In that case, one expects that 
once individual characteristics are controlled for, duration dependence becomes spurious.  
The alternative possibility is that poverty experience has a genuine causal impact on 
future poverty.  According to Biewen(2003) and Biewen(2004), this may be because low 
income may be associated with adverse work incentives which make it not worthwhile 
for an individual to take up a job if unemployed or even to keep a low-paid job (the 
poverty trap).  Or this may be due to loss of motivation or depreciation of human capital 
which complicates the search for a new job.  The reasons for dependence in poverty are 
obviously  of  interest  for  developing  effective  poverty  reducing  measures  since  true 
dependence  would  suggest  to  focus  on  stigma  and  adverse  work  incentives  while 
                                                 
3 Fenge-Pestieau(2005),  Blöndal-Scarpetta(1998), Grüber-Wise(1999), Grüber-Wise(2004). 
4 Boldrin-Dolado-Jimeno-Peracchi(1999), Fenge-Pestieau(2005) ), Jousten-Lefebvre-Perelman-
Pestieau(2008). 
5 Dorn-Souza(2005), Lindeboom(1998), Jousten (2005).   3
spurious dependence would suggest to change individual’s characteristics and abilities.  
Following  Meghir-Whitehouse(1997),  Devicienti(2002),  Biewen(2003),  Fertig-
Tamm(2007)  and  Hansen-Wahlberg(2004)  the  question  whether  duration  dependence 
reflects  true  duration  dependence  or  individual  heterogeneity  is  analyzed  through  a 
multiple-spell model of transitions in and out of poverty, controlling for observed and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity and for a potential initial condition problem.  For 
Belgium,  this  issue  has  been  addressed  for  welfare  spells  in  Cockx(1998)  and  for 
unemployment spells(Cockx-Dejemeppe(2005)). 
 
This  paper  is  structured  as  follows.    Section  2  explains  the  matching  between  the 
administrative dataset and Census.  Section 3 describes at the aggregate population level 
the observed poverty transition rates associated with the duration of a (non)poverty spell.  
If there are individual-specific unobserved factors that affect the hazard, the aggregate 
transition rates will tend to be different from those at the individual level.  In order to 
examine this, section 4 estimates a multiple spell discrete-time hazard model through 
which we estimate simultaneously exit and re-entry rates while allowing for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity and controlling for a potential initial condition problem.  This 
section  also  contains  an  overview  of  the  modelling  literature  on  poverty  dynamics.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Data Construction 
 
The results presented below are derived from a micro-dataset provided by the National 
Institute for Statistics that contains information on 30183 Belgian households
6 of which 
at least one member is between 55 and 75 years old on 31 December 2001 and that were 
randomly selected out of the National Register.  Of these 30183 households, one keeps 
                                                 
6 That is 60806 individuals.  A household is defined as the number of individuals having the same domicile, 
as registered in the National Register.  On the basis of the National Register of 2001, 93.66% of the 60806 
individuals are head(49,6%), partner of the head(29.35%) or child(14.72%) of the head of the household.  
Only 6.33% has another kind of relationship to the head: 1.25% are grandchild, 0.76% parent of the head, 
0.47% child-in-law, 0.48% parent in law, 0.46% brother or sister and 2.22% are no family related 
habitants,…   4
the individuals that are between 55-75 years old in 2001.  This reduces the number of 
individuals of the final dataset from 60806 to 43726. 
 
These 30183 households (corresponding to 43726 individuals) have in the first place been 
connected  to  the  Income  Tax  Returns  data  (1991  –  2002)
7  (=ITR)  by  means  of  the 
national  identification  number.    This  implies  that  the  individuals  in  our  dataset  are 
between 45- 65 years old in 1992, 46-66 in 1993, 47-67 in 1994,….  This administrative 
dataset contains the yearly information necessary to calculate the income tax of the fiscal 
household to which the individual belongs.  The variables it includes are civil status, 
number and type of dependants in the fiscal household, gross capital income, the age and 
gross labour income, replacement incomes of the household members (old-age pension, 
early  retirement,  unemployment,  illness  or  disability  benefits,  …),  housing  wealth, 
occupational  pension  benefits,  employee  contributions  in  occupational  pension  plans, 
private subsidized savings.  Every year, about 86% of the individuals selected out of the 
National Register could be matched with the ITR.  This means that in a given year about 
14% of the Belgian civil population are not in the ITR.
8  However, only 4.2% of the 
individuals selected out of the National Register and between 55-75 years old in 2001 
(that is 1844 of 43726) or 4.9% of the households (that is 1502 of 30183), do not appear 
in  the  ITR  for  any  year  1991-2002  and  will  have  to  be  deleted  from  the  analysis 
altogether
9.  We will discuss this issue below.  The stability over time in the percentage 
of individuals out of the ITR masks thus considerable income mobility at the individual 
level in and out of the ITR.   
 
Interestingly the 30183 households (corresponding to 43726 individuals) selected out of 
the National Register could also be merged with the Census of 2001 through the use of 
                                                 
7 Note that 723 of the 30183 households group several fiscal household units.  For example, two 
widowers/divorced/single individuals living together but filling in separate tax files are two fiscal 
households but will be considered as one household.  However, one does not know whether before 2001 
these individuals are living together what may generate measurement errors.  We suppose they are living 
together from the first year in which they are observed both as declarant in the ITR while it may be they 
start living together only a few years afterwards.   
8 This confirms the finding of Perelman-Schleiper-Stevart(1998) that 13% of the Belgian population do not 
declare incomes.  
9 However, their full socio-economic profile can be established since they are in the Census of 2001.    5
the national identification number.  This survey has a response rate at the level of the 
individual of 98,7%.  It contains detailed information on education level, professional 
category  (private  sector  employee,  civil  servant,  self-employed,…),  the  sector  the 
household  member  works  or  worked  in  (agriculture,  banking,  construction,  transport, 
chemical industry, real estate, army, retail, …) and also the self-reported general health 
status.   
Table 1: Construction Dataset 
  Number of households  Number of individuals 
National Register  30183  60806 
National register 55-75 years old  30183  43726 
National Register 55-75 years old, matched 
with Census of 2001 


















25515 (matching: 84,5%) 
25559 (matching: 84,6%) 
25326 (matching: 83,9%) 
24778 (matching: 82,0%) 
25566 (matching: 84,7%) 
25727 (matching: 85,2%) 
25850 (matching: 85,6%) 
25855 (matching: 85,6%) 
25914 (matching: 85,8%) 
25982 (matching: 86,0%) 






37023 (matching: 84,67%) 
37115 (matching: 84,88%) 
36856 (matching: 84,29%) 
36208 (matching: 82,80%) 
37213 (matching: 85,10%) 
37465 (matching: 85,68%) 
37651 (matching: 86,10%) 
37677 (matching: 86,16%) 
37764 (matching: 86,36%) 
37819 (matching: 86,49%) 
38213 (matching: 87,39%) 
Number of individuals (households) that never appear in ITR between 1991-2002: 1844 (1502
10) 
Number of individuals(households) that appear at least one year in ITR between 1991-2002: 41882 (28681
11) 
 
As can be seen from table 1, the number of households is not for every year of the ITR 
the same: households may temporally or permanently drop out of the ITR.  According to 
article 178 of the Royal Decree corresponding to the Belgian income tax code of 1992, 
                                                 
10 1635 households with a member that does not declare - 133 households where at least one member 
declares income. 
11 28548 households where every member declares+133 households where at least one member declares 
income.   6
are not obliged to declare incomes: 1° households without professional activity with an 
income below the minimum taxable income (except singles/widow(er)s with dependent 
children) and 2° households of which the income only consists of old-age pensions and 
housing wealth.  It is unfortunately
12 impossible to know whether a dropout is due to 1° 
or 2°
13.   Individuals that  drop out because of  reason 1°  may  from  the moment  their 
income exceeds the minimum taxable income reappear in the ITR.  If that happens we 
qualify missing periods before the reappearance as periods in poverty.  Eligibility rules 
for old-age pension benefits can also be used to qualify missing observations as periods 
in  poverty.    Table  2  shows  how  this  correction  reduces  the  number  of  unbalanced 
households.  Individuals that drop out because of reason 2° or because of reason 1° that 
do not reappear, will from that moment on never appear again in the ITR.  We treat these 
drop-outs as right-censored observations
14. 
Table 2: Unbalanced data 










1  279  0.97  671  2.34 
2  199  0.69  469  1.64 
3  217  0.76  499  1.74 
4  229  0.80  476  1.66 
5  277  0.97  567  1.98 
6  266  0.93  548  1.91 
7  359  1.25  651  2.27 
8  380  1.32  689  2.40 
9  481  1.68  825  2.88 
10  453  1.58  1169  4.08 
11  845  2.95  2743  9.56 
12  24696  86.11  19375  67.55 
TOTAL  28681  100.00  28681  100.00 
 
                                                 
12 A technical possibility was to merge the data with an existing dataset of means-tested beneficiaries for 
the years 1991-2001 but access to this dataset was not allowed, although this would enable us to identify 
(part of) 1°. 
13 For sure, a dropout cannot be due to death since the sampling scheme also implies that individuals are 
sampled conditional on being alive in 2001.  If poor singles would be more likely to die this could induces 
an endogenous selection problem.  Up to this stage, this has been neglected. 
14 As Devicienti(2002), Stevens(1999), Devicienti-Gualtieri(2007), Fertig-Tamm(2007).   However to the 
extent that the dropouts because of reason 1° cannot be considered as random censoring, the sample 
selection problem they might induce should be modeled explicitly.  This is an issue for future research.  
Capellari-Jenkins(2004) models attrition simultaneously with poverty transitions for UK and Lillard-
Panis(1998) models household composition and attrition simultaneously for US but both find that attrition 
induces a negligeable bias in the estimation results.   7
The correction reduces the number of missing observations of individuals that appear at 
least once in the ITR from 11.9% to 5.4% of total observations
15.  The effect of this 
correction is to increase poverty persistence, increase the number of households that is 
once confronted with poverty and to change the coefficients of duration dependence in 
the regressions.  However it doesn’t change any of the general conclusions on the issues 
under study.   
 
Finally we calculate for every household
16 its net income, convert it in real terms
17 and 
inflate net real income by the OECD equivalence scale that attributes 1 to the head of the 
household, 0.5 per additional adult and 0.3 per child.   
 
In the remainder, the focus of attention will be the head of the household
18 but the unit for 
calculating income is the household.  This means the head of the household is qualified 
poor if the income of the household to which he pertains is below the poverty line.  The 
latter is defined as 50% of median net equivalised income
19 of the whole economy. 
 
3.  Descriptive analysis of the dynamics of poverty 
 
The longitudinal dataset presented in the previous section is well suited to describe the 
dynamics of poverty.  We will start with a description of flows into and out of poverty 
and the distribution of periods spent in poverty.     
                                                 
15 The number of missing observations (41190 out of a total of 344172(=12years times 28681 households 
that appear at least once in the ITR observations) could be reduced to 18888.  We also qualified the missing 
observations (1792 = 4.3% of 41190) of households with 0 years in poverty, at least 10 years out of poverty 
and mean income pooled over all available years of more than 140% of the poverty line as non-poor.  
These correspond to measurement errors of old-age pensioners or temporary emigration but not to a 
poverty experience. 
16 For two widowers or divorced living together, net incomes are calculated separately for each fiscal 
household.  Then the net income of all fiscal households is summed and in a last step the equivalence scale 
is applied on this sum. 
17 With year 2002 as reference year.  
18 The head of the household is the individual that declares income.  For married individuals, the fiscal 
legislation says it is the man.  In 2838 households the spouse of the declarant becomes declarant herself due 
to death of her husband or divorce.  Similarly, if the head of the fiscal household is not between 55-75 
years old in 2001, but the partner of the head is, we take the partner as head of the household (1983 
households). In cases with two fiscal households living together (723 households),the head is the member 
that is most years in the ITR.   
19 That were kindly provided by the National Institute for Statistics.   8
 
3.1. To start, table 3 shows the distribution of the total number of years spent in poverty.  
Table 3: distribution of total number of years spent in poverty
20 








0  17997  /  0.63 
1  2435  0.22  0.085 
2  1212  0.11  0.042 
3  944  0.086  0.032 
4  721  0.066  0.025 
5  781  0.071  0.027 
6  624  0.057  0.021 
7  586  0.053  0.020 
8  513  0.047  0.017 
9  548  0.050  0.019 
10  577  0.053  0.020 
11  644  0.059  0.022 
12 or more  1099  0.101  0.038 
Number of households that are at least 1 year in poverty: 10684 
Number of households: 28681 
 
The fact that 63% of the elderly households is never poor implies that 37% of them is 
once confronted with poverty.  This is much higher than the “static” poverty rates of 
around 12% that are found on the basis of the PSBH in Cantillon(1999) and also on the 
basis of our own dataset.  Deleeck-Cantillon(1992) find similarly on the basis of two 
waves of the SEP that of the whole population 10.8% is poor
21 in 1988 and 1985, 73% is 
not poor in 1988 and neither in 1985 while 16.2% is once poor during that period.   
 
For our data, the transitory poor, that are poor for exactly one year, account for 8.5% of 
all households.  Those that are poor for at least 3 years make up 66% of those who ever 
have been poor and 24% of all households.  In general most people that slip into poverty 
are quite successful in getting out.  But precisely because this is true the transitory poor 
                                                 
20 Including left-censored spells 
21 Poverty line is 50% of average income.   9
are a small fraction of the poor at any point in time and those with longer poverty spells 
account for the bulk of all poverty.   
 
3.2.  The degree of persistence of poverty and the recurrent poor cannot be read from 
table 19.  It is not because households are in total 3 years poor that these are 3 
consecutive years in poverty.  The persistently poor are poor for at least 3 consecutive 
years.  The recurrent poor are poor for at least one year but never longer than 2 
consecutive years.  It is thus possible that a recurrent poor is for example poor for 5 years 
in total but is not persistently poor.  Table 4 shows that more than 60% of the elderly who 
once have been poor are persistently poor. 
Table 4: Persistent and recurrent poverty among elderly
22 
  Number of households  % of population  % of those who are poor at least once 
Persistent  6499  0.22  0.61 
Recurrent poor  4185  0.14  0.39 
Number of households that are at least one year in poverty: 10684 
Number of households: 28681 
    
3.3. The number of consecutive years one is in poverty defines a poverty spell.  When 
studying poverty spells arises the issue of censored spells.  Suppose a household is 
counted poor for exactly one year.  We would qualify it as transitory poor.  However if 
that year corresponds to the first/last year of observation the duration of the poverty spell 
is underestimated if the household was poor before the sampling began/after the sampling 
stopped.  The following table displays the considerable percentage of censored poverty 
spells.  It will be discussed below how account will be taken of censored spells. 
Table 5: Censored poverty spells 
  Number of households  % of population  % of those who are poor at least once 
Left-censored  5082  0.17  0.47 
Right-censored  5200  0.18  0.48 
Left and right censored  2758  0.09  0.25 
Number of households that are poor at least once: 10684 
Number of households: 28681 
 
                                                 
22 Including left-censored spells.   10
3.4. From the moment that the data are arranged such that each household is associated 
with the duration of one (or more) spells, one can calculate exit and (re)entry rates.  The 
exit rate associated with a given duration of a spell is the number of households that exit 
at that length of the spell divided by the population at risk of exiting.  The survivor 
function associated with a certain spell duration specifies the probability that an 
individual will survive in that spell beyond that duration.  Spells that are right-censored 
are included in all but the censored year.  Figures 1 and 2 plot the poverty exit rates and 
survivor function with and without left-censored spells but as can be seen they do not 
differ a lot from each other
23.  



























with left-censored without left-censored  





















with left-censoring without left-censoring  
 
The exit rate is high for the transitory poor and low for those that are long-term poor.  
The survivor function decreases sharply in the first years but after some years it seems to 
                                                 
23 The exclusion of left-censored spells implies that exit rates can only be calculated for a duration of 
maximum10 years.   11
stabilize.  This means that the longer somebody is poor, the more difficult it becomes to 
leave poverty.   
 
To find the (re)entry probabilities, one calculates for each of the households at risk of 
(re)entering poverty the length of the spell that they are out of poverty.  Then for each 
possible length of the spell the number of individuals that enter poverty is divided by the 
population at risk of (re)entering.  The results, whether left-censored spells are included 
or not, are in figures 3 and 4 and differ quite a lot
24.  The reentry rates with left-censored 
spells are commonly called entry rates.  Probabilities of entering poverty are very low 
and around 1-2%: they are based on households that may or may not have been poor 
once.  Re-entry rates are up to 4-6 times higher than the entry rates indicating that the 
probability of becoming poor is much higher for households who have been poor than for 
those who have not.   



























with left-censored without left-censored  



























with left-censored without left-censored  
                                                 
24 The exclusion of left-censored spells implies that the entry rates can only be calculated for a duration of 
maximum 10 years.   12
 
Survivor functions represent the cumulative risk of slipping back into poverty after a 
previous exit.  Of those who quit poverty, about 60% are still out of poverty after 12 
years.  Thus 40% of those who quit poverty will fall back into poverty. 
 
The question that interests us is whether the exit rates out of poverty and reentry rates 
into poverty, that are downward sloping, remain so, after one has controlled for all kind 
of individual effects.  To the extent that individual characteristics like the lack of abilities 
persist over time, they may be the reason that Belgian elderly persist in poverty over 
time.  If this would be true, one expects that after controlling for individual-specific 
effects,  duration  dependence  will  no  more  be  significant.    Alternatively,  if  current 
poverty experience has a causal impact on future poverty experience, one expects that 
negative duration dependence remains significant.  To check this, a multivariate analysis 
is necessary, to which we turn now.   
 
4.  A multiple-spell discrete-time hazard model of poverty dynamics 
 
The purpose of this section is to verify whether duration dependence in the exit and re-
entry rates is due to individual heterogeneity or true duration dependence through the 
estimation  of  a  multiple-spell  discrete-time  hazard  model  while  controlling  for 
unobserved effects and a potential initial condition problem (4.3.).  We start this section 
with an overview of the existing empirical models of poverty dynamics (4.1.), followed 
by a presentation of the model that will be used for our purposes (4.2.). 
 
4.1. Previous modelling research on poverty dynamics 
 
We briefly overview the empirical literature because we want to point out why we do not 
use some type of models and why only one type of model is appropriate for our purpose.  
In the end, we discuss the few models that have been estimated on Belgian data.     
 
4.1.1.  Component of variance models   13
 
One of  the  first  to  study poverty  dynamics  are  Lillard-Willis(1978)  who  estimate  an 
earnings model with log of earnings it y as dependent variable, individual N i ,..., 1 = at time 
T t ,..., 1 =  and it x a vector of observed explanatory variables: 
 
it it it v x y + = b   
 
The error structure has the form:  it it i it u v c v + + = -1 g with  i c an unobserved effect, it u  a 
random  error  term  and  g a  serial  correlation  coefficient  common  to  all  individuals.  
However, if the serial correlation in the error structure results from misspecification of 
the population model:  it i it it it u c y x y + + + = -1 r b  ,   i c is correlated with  1 - it y  and the use 
of instrumental variables may be necessary.  Up to now, these models did not address 
either the fact that explanatory variables such as household composition or labour market 
status  that  are  often  included  might  be  endogenous  to  the  dynamics  of  income.    In 
addition, a common variance structure is assumed for the entire population while the 
dynamics of individuals in different parts of the income distribution might be different.  
According  to  Stevens(1999)  and  Devicienti(2002),  they  perform  less  than  duration 
models in predicting poverty.  A recent application is Fouarge-Muffels(2003).     
 
4.1.2.  Duration models and transition probability models 
 
Bane-Ellwood(1986)
25 calculate duration dependent exit probabilities and the distribution 
of entering poverty and of exiting poverty as a function of events (change in household 
composition or household income).  They also calculate the expected duration of poverty 
as a function of events associated with the beginning of a poverty spell.  Although this is 
not a multivariate analysis, they initiate a new strand of a literature that analyzes the 
determinants of flows into and out of poverty.   
 
                                                 
25 For the US.  For the UK, see Jenkins(1998), Jenkins(2000), Jenkins-Rigg(2000). For Germany, see Otto-
Siedler(2003).  For Germany, US, UK, Canada, see Antolin-Dang-Oxley(1999).   14
Transition probability models are developed with probability of (re)entry in and exit out 
of poverty as dependent variable and as independent variables change in employment 
status and/or household composition, components of household income, individual and 
household characteristics
26.  At the same time models arise that estimate the probability 
of (re)entry in and exit out of poverty as dependent variable with dummies for duration, 
individual and household characteristics as independent variables.  The latter are in fact 
equivalent to discrete-time hazard models, as shown by Allison(1984) and Jenkins(1995).   
 
More  complicated  discrete-time  hazard  models  extend  the  analysis  from  single  to 
multiple spells.  Most of these estimate poverty transition equations separately
27 under 
the hypothesis that, for a given individual, entry rates and exit rates can be treated as 
conditionally  independent  and  that  multiple  spells  of  the  same  event  type  are 
conditionally independent.  A first extension to this, as Callens-Croux-Avramov(2003) 
and Arranz-Cantto(2006), is to allow for different baseline hazards in case of multiple 
spells of the same event type for a given individual.  An additional extension captures not 
only correlation between spells of the same event type but in addition that individuals 
with high(low) exit rates have lower(higher) reentry rates. Stevens(1999)
28 is the first to 
estimate  exit  and  reentry  equations  of  poverty  simultaneously  while  allowing  the 
unobserved effect of the two transition equations to be correlated.  This leads to more 
accurate estimates of total time spent in poverty.  The same method of joint estimation of 
entry  and  exit  equations  is  applied  by  Devicienti(2002),  Jenkins-Rigg  (2001), 
Biewen(2003),  Fertig-Tamm(2007),  Devicienti-Gualtieri(2007),  Biewen(2003), 
Wahlberg-Hansen(2004).  For these joint estimations, the most frequent distributions for 
                                                 
26 Bourreau-Dubois-Jeandidier-Berger(2003), Bardasi-Jenkins-Rigg(2000), Valletta(2005), Dewilde(2004), 
McKernan-Ratcliffe(2002), Antolin-Dang-Oxley(1999), Fouarge-Layte(2003). 
27 McKernan-Ratcliffe(2002), Finnie-Sweetman(2002), Devicienti(2001a), Antolin-Oxley-Dang(1999), 
Zoyem(2002), Fouarge-Layte(2003), Valletta(2005), Dewilde(2004), Makovec(2005), Bourreau-Dubois-
Jeandidier-Berger(2003), Devicienti(2007), Capellari(2007), Jenkins-Rigg(2001), Arranz-Cantto(2006).  
Arranz-Cantto(2006), McKernan-Ratcliffe(2002), Finnie-Sweetman(2002), Antolin-Dang-Oxley(1999), 
Fouarge-Layte(2003) and Devicienti(2001a) include however the number or length of previous spells, 
although this is an endogenous variable.  Note also that even if the exit and entry processes would be 
independent, estimating them jointly instead of separately would be more efficient. 
28 Following Meghir-Whitehouse(1997) who estimate jointly unemployment and employment spells, while 
accounting for unobserved effects and an initial conditions problem.   15
the unobserved effect are the discrete distribution with a finite number of support points 
29 and the multivariate normal distribution
30.   
 
There  exist  also  discrete-time  duration  models  that  estimate  exit  and  reentry  rates 
separately  while  accounting  for  unobserved  heterogeneity:  Capellari(2007),  Finnie-
Ross(2002), Fouarge-Layte(2003), Makovec(2005).  However, it appears
31 that for single 
spell  data,  estimation  results  are  sensitive  to  misspecification  of  the  distribution  of 
unobserved effects while for multiple-spell models, it is much more easier to estimate 
parameters that are robust to the functional form of the unobserved effect
32.   
 
The  discrete-time  hazard  model  takes  account  of  right-censored  spells
33  under  the 
assumption they are randomly censored but left-censored spells are more problematic.  
Excluding them, as a lot of models do
34, could result in a sample selection bias in the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity.  Lancaster(1990) notes: “The common treatment 
of stock sampled data with future spells observed is to ignore the elapsed duration data 
and to base inferences solely on those spells that begin after the sampling data.  This is a 
sensible and correct way to proceed in models that do not involve unmeasured person-
specific heterogeneity.  Unfortunately, in models that do involve such heterogeneity there 
is a further complication to consider due to the fact that the distribution of unobservable 
quantities also depends of the sampling scheme”
35.    If the probability that the first spell 
will  be  poverty  or  non-poverty  depends  on  individual  characteristics  including  any 
unobserved  heterogeneity,  excluding  left-censored  spells  creates  an  initial  conditions 
                                                 
29 Meghir-Whitehouse(1997), Stevens(1999),Devicienti(2002), Hansen-Wahlberg(2004), Biewen(2003), 
Fertig-Tamm(2007) use the Heckman-Singer(1984) estimator. 
30 Lillard-Panis(1998). 
31 Heckman-Singer(1984).  Meyer(1990, p.771) notes that “it is plausible that much of the parameter 
instability found by Heckman-Singer(1984) is due to their assumption of a Weibull baseline hazard.  When 
the baseline hazard is nonparametrically estimated, the choice of  heterogeneity distribution may be 
unimportant”.  Nicoletti(2006,p.19) finds in the same line for discrete-time hazard models that 
“misspecifying the random effects distribution biases neither the duration dependence nor the covariate 
coefficients estimation”. 
32 van den Berg(2001). 
33Each individual contributes to the likelihood function for every year he is in the dataset but depending on 
whether the last interval is censored or not the dependent variable of the last contribution equals 0 or 1.     
34 Bane-Elwood(1986), Antolin-Dang-Oxley(1999), Finnie-Sweetman(2002), Devicienti(2001a - 2002), 
Fouarge-Layte(2003), Makovec(2005), Devicienti(2007), Arranz-Cantto(2006).  The problem of left-
censoring is absent in the case of flow sampling (Cockx(1998),Dejemeppe-Cockx(2005)).  
35 P.189.   16
problem  whereby  the  identity  of  the  first  spell  is  endogenous.    To  control  for  this 
selection  bias,  Devicienti(2002),  Biewen(2003),  Fertig-Tamm(2007),  Wahlberg-
Hansen(2004)  extend  the  analysis  of  Stevens(1999)  and  estimate  the  entry  and  exit 
equations jointly with an initial condition equation, as Meghir-Whitehouse(1997), while 
allowing  the  unobserved  effects  in  the  transition  equations  to  be  correlated  with  the 
unobserved effect in the initial condition equation.  In order to identify the model, the 
initial condition equation contains exclusion restrictions.  Whitehouse-Meghir(1997) use 
unemployment rates at the first time the spell is observed, Fertig-Tamm(2007) dummies 
for the year of the first observation and education level of the parents of the household 
head, Biewen(2003) the education level of the parents and city where the individual grew 
up, Devicienti( 2002) the education level of the parents of the household and Hansen-
Wahlberg(2004)  uses  no  exclusion  restrictions  at  all  what  implies  that  the  model  is 
supposed to be identified by the functional form of the unobserved effects.  Another 
possibility to treat the sample selection bias induced by stock-sampling is to include left-
censored spells but to correct the likelihood function for the fact that the length of the 
first spells is underestimated.  This requires the assumption of a constant entry rate and a 
constant survivor function or  additional data such as the aggregate number of entering 
poverty at each calendar date in the past as is empirically relevant such that one can 
construct, as Nickell(1979), a model for the entry rate and survival function.  There are 
no such data for Belgium and thus one cannot apply this method.     
 
4.1.3.  Dynamic unobserved effect models 
 
Dynamic unobserved effect models are developed in unemployment dynamics literature 
by    Heckman(1981),  Arulampalam-Booth-Taylor(2000),  Stewart-Sheffield(1999), 
Stewart(2007)  and  also  have  found  poverty  applications.    Specify  the  model  for 
individual i=1,…,N at time t=2,…,T as 
 
it i it it it u c y x y + + + = -1
' * g b  
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Where 
*
it y  denotes the unobservable propensity to be poor,  1 - it y the observed poverty 
status in t-1,  it x a vector of observable characteristics, i c  an unobserved effect and  it u  a 















.  The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable allows to test for 
state  dependence.    In  contrast  to  discrete-time  hazard  and  components-of-variance 
models that take into account a history of lags, this model assumes thus that one lag of 
poverty  status  is  sufficient  to  capture  its  full  dynamics.    According  to  Devicienti-
Gualtieri(2007)  the  significant  duration  dependence  in  observed  transition  rates  casts 
doubts on the first-order lag often assumed in empirical work.  To estimate this model, 
one  first  integrates  out  the  unobserved  effect  by  assuming  a  distribution  for i c that  is 
independent from  it x , usually a normal or Gamma.   Secondly if the initial observation 
of it y   is  correlated  with i c ,  this  raises  the  initial  conditions  problem.    According  to 
Heckman(1981),    Cappellari-Dorsett-Haile(2007)  estimate  jointly  with  the  poverty 
transition equation an initial condition equation while allowing for correlation between 
the unobserved effects affecting the poverty transition and initial condition equations.  
With  the  idea  that  initial  labour  market  states,  but  not  transitions,  depend  upon  the 
macroeconomic conditions prevailing at the time, they use GDP growth rate measured in 
the year of the first observation as exclusion restriction.  Another approach has been 
suggested  by  Wooldridge(2002)  that  consists  of  modelling  the  distribution  of  the 
unobserved effect conditional on the initial poverty status.  It is applied by Poggi(2007) 
and  Biewen(2004)
36.    Biewen(2004)  challenges  in  addition  the  assumption  of  strict 
exogeneity of the explanatory variables, that is that is there must not be any feedback 
from current poverty to future values of the explanatory variables employment status and 
household composition. To this end, he estimates a joint dynamic random effects model 
of  poverty  status,  employment  status  and  household  composition  status.      Since  the 
                                                 
36 McKernan-Ratcliffe(2002) condition the unobserved effect on the initial poverty status in a discrete-time 
hazard model.  They find that individuals with left-censored (non)poverty spells are significantly less likely 
to (enter)exit poverty.     18
assumption of one lag of poverty status is unreasonable in our case, we did not estimate 
this model. 
 
4.1.4.  Markovian transition models 
 
Capellari-Jenkins(2002),  Capellari-Jenkins(2004),  Cappellari(1999),  VanKerm(2004) 
model  entry  and  exit  probabilities  simultaneously  using  an  endogenous  switching 
regression  model  with  a  binary  dependent  variable
37.    Specify  the  poverty  transition 
equation for individual i= 1,…,N at time t = 2,…,T as 
 













2 g the coefficient estimates conditioning on being poor respectively non-poor in t-
1, 1 - it x  a vector of observable characteristics,  i c an unobserved effect and  it u a random 















.  These models typically account for different sources of non-random 
selection such as attrition and initial conditions by estimating jointly an initial condition 
equation and attrition equation with the poverty transition equation while allowing the 
unobserved  effects  of  these  equations  to  be  correlated  with  a  multivariate  normal 
distribution.  Heckman(1981) suggested the use of pre-sample information such as the 
education level, occupation, labour market status of the parents of the household head as 
exclusion restriction.  Model estimates can be used to derive predictions of the poverty 
persistence rate and entry rate.  In contrast to the dynamic unobserved effect models, the 
lag  structure  in  1 - it x rules  out  the  possibility  of  instantaneous  effects  of  changes  in 
characteristics for poverty status.  For example changes in employment status are not 
allowed to affect poverty until the next period. In addition, one may have doubts on the 
                                                 
37 Following Stewart-Swaffield(1999) who used this model to estimate low pay dynamics.   19
appropriateness of the first-order dynamics assumption
38.  That is why we did not use this 
model. 
 
4.1.5.  Structural models 
 
Aasve-Burgess-Dickson-Propper(2006) argue that poverty is not a decision variable but 
rather the outcome of underlying behavioural decisions such as whether to work, to have 
children, to marry and divorce.  They estimate 5 simultaneous hazards (childbearing, 
marriage,  divorce,  employment  and  non-employment)  while  allowing  the  unobserved 
effects  of  these  5  equations  to  be  correlated  according  to  a  multivariate  normal 
distribution.    From  these  results,  one  can  derive  a  model  for  income  dynamics  and 
poverty.  In their model all persistence within poverty is attributed to persistence within 
demographic  and  labour  market  states.    Although  already  very  time-consuming  and 
complex, they only account for two labour market statuses such as employed versus non-
employed while we are interested in the transitions between disability, unemployed, self-
employed  or  employed,  old-age  pension  and  early  retired.    In  addition  there  is  no 
consensus on whether these labour market transitions are voluntary or involuntary: early 
retirement  may  result  from  an  unfavourable  labour  demand.    Finally,  changes  in 
household composition, like becoming widow, can difficultly be treated as a behavioural 
decision.  For these reasons, we did not estimate this model. 
 
After this overview of the existing research on modelling poverty transitions, let us look 
what models have been applied to Belgian data.  In Belgium, models on the duration of 
unemployment  spells  (Dejemeppe-Cockx(2005))  and  welfare  spells(Cockx(1998))  are 
available, as well as models on poverty persistence but not for elderly.  Van Kerm(2004) 
finds, through the estimation of a Markov transition model, on the PSBH on a population 
between 25 and 55 years old that poverty entry depends on household and employment 
status.  In particular being unemployed, self-employed or single increases the risk of 
poverty entry.  He controls for the endogeneity of the initial poverty status by estimating 
jointly with the poverty transition equation an initial condition equation while allowing 
                                                 
38 Devicienti-Gualtieri(2007).   20
the  unobserved  effects  of  these  equations  to  be  correlated  with  a  trivariate  normal 
distribution.  He does not consider the possibility that household and employment status 
that are included as explanatory variables might be endogenous.  Indeed, current poverty 
status may affect future employment and household composition.  Similarly, Nicaise-
Deblander(2005) estimated a Markovian switching model on the PSBH for the years 
1993-1997  for  the  working  age  population,  while  controlling  for  initial  condition 
equations.  As an extension to VanKerm(2004), Nicaise-Deblander(2005) controlled in 
addition for possible endogeneity of employment status (but not for household status). 
They find that initial employment status is insignificant to explain initial poverty status 
and transitions into poverty but is significant in explaining poverty exit
39.  Household 
composition has a significant effect on poverty transitions.  Dewilde (2004) finds through 
the  separate estimation of  a  transition probability  model on the PSBH for the whole 
population  that  poverty  entry  and exit  depend  on household and  employment  related 
events.  In particular entry into unemployment, disability, (early)retirement is associated 
with entry into poverty.  Makovec(2005) uses a discrete-time hazard model to estimate 
separately poverty entry and exit equations for those above 55 years old in the ECHP, 
taking  into  account  unobserved  heterogeneity.    For  the  entry  model,  he  finds  that 
accounting for unobserved effects leads to spurious dependence.  Like Vankerm(2004), 
Makovec(2005)  includes  household  and  employment  status  as  explanatory  variables, 
ignoring  possible  endogeneity.    He  includes  dummies  for  employed  versus  non-
employed, for aged above or below 65, for receipt of disability and old age benefits.  
None of the above dummies is significant except the receipt of disability benefits that 
increase poverty exit.  That is the opposite result of Dewilde(2004) although the dataset 
in the ECHP for Belgium is also the PSBH.  Dewilde(2004) though does not control for 
duration effects, nor for unobserved effects that are highly significant in Makovec(2005).  
On the other hand, Makovec(2005) used a very small sample limited to those above 55 
years old while also Dewilde(2004) reports problems with limited sample size.  Although 
he conditions on unobserved effects, Makovec(2005) does not adress the issue of left-
censored spells.   
                                                 
39 Instead of a simultaneous estimation of poverty and employment equation, they followed a less efficient 
two-step procedure.   21
 
4.2. The model   
 
Following  Meghir-Whitehouse(1997),  Stevens(1999),  Devicienti(2002)  and 
Biewen(2003), we estimate the discrete-time hazard model, given our interest in duration 
dependence.  Although in the real world poverty transitions can occur at any time, the 
model is in discrete time since the data are grouped into intervals of one calendar year.  
There are two types of spells: poverty spells (k=p) and non-poverty spells (k=np).  We 
assume that the probability that an individual i=1,…,N leaves the spell of type k in the 
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*   denotes  the  unobservable 
propensity to be in a spell of type k,  it x is a vector of observable characteristics, 
k b the 
vector of coefficients associated with it x , ) (d f
k is a function of duration dependence that 
represents the baseline hazard and where d=1,…,D  denotes the duration of the current 
spell and D is the maximum duration of a spell.  We will adopt a flexible specification for 
the  baseline  hazard
40  where  D
k
D
k k k DU DU DU d f a a a + + + = ... ) ( 2 2 1 1 and  d DU   are 
dummies corresponding to a duration d.  We assume that individuals enter a spell at d=0 
and are at risk of leaving the spell at d=1,….,D
41.  Unobserved heterogeneity enters the 
specification of the hazard rate as an individual-specific additive error term 
k
i c constant 
over time which is allowed to be correlated across different types of spells.  We are thus 
estimating a binary response model where the dependent variable 
                                                 
40 Lancaster notes “there is nothing to be gained by adopting the more elaborate proportional hazard model 
over the piecewise-constant one.  Essentially, since with grouped data we can know nothing about the way 
the hazard varies within the interval, the best we can do is to estimate its average level and we might as 
well work with the simplest model, in which that level is constant”, p.181. 
41 Wooldridge(2002) notes:“usually the duration dummies are unrestricted, in which case  it x does not 
contain an intercept”(p.709).  Alternatively, as explained by Jenkins(2001), one can drop one duration 
dummy to use it as a reference and fit an overall intercept term of the model.  In our 12 year data set, the 
exclusion of left-censored spells implies that exit rates can only be calculated up to a maximum duration of 
10 years (se also figures 2 and 3). So D=10 if we do not use an intercept and D=9 if we do use an intercept 
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= .  In the absence of unobserved heterogeneity( 0 =
k
i c ) 
one  assumes  that  the  exit  and  re-entry  equations  represent  conditionally  independent 
processes and therefore the log-likelihood function can be maximised separately for all 
spells of a given type k as:  { } ￿ ￿
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) log( ) 1 log( ) 1 ( log  where  it l  
indicates whether an exit from the spell is observed for individual i in t( 1 = it l ) or not 
( 0 = it l ) and  1 = it m if for individual i in t a spell of type k is being observed and  0 = it m  
otherwise.   
 
If the transition equations depend on a random effect that is allowed to be correlated 
across spells of different types ( 0 ¹
k
i c ), poverty and non-poverty spells cannot be treated 
separately and a simultaneous estimation is necessary.  One might expect indeed that 
there  are  individual-specific  unobserved  effects  like  ability,  motivation  or  general 
attitudes that affect each type of transitions.  If individuals have a high propensity to 
leave poverty, one may expect they have also have a low propensity to reenter poverty.  If 
that would be so, there would be negative correlation among the unobserved effects of 
                                                 
42 Studies on poverty dynamics use a logistic, normal or extreme value distribution for the random error 
term. Stevens(1999) and Devicienti(2002) use a logistic distribution for the random error term, Meghir-
Whitehouse(1997), Fertig-Tamm(2007), Biewen(2003) and Hansen-Wahlberg(2004) a normal distribution, 
Bardasi-Jenkins-Rigg(2001) an extreme value distribution. Sueyoshi(1995) explores the implications of 
these specifications for hazard behaviour and notes that “practical experience with discrete-choice models 
suggests that the predicted probabilities and hence the goodness-of-fit tests for the models will generally be 
quite  similar.”    Apart  from  goodness-of-fit  tests,  “results  from  the  logit  and  proportional  hazard 
specifications will be quite similar.  In contrast, estimates from a probit-type group duration model should 
depart significantly from both of these specifications, exhibiting covariate effects that are decidedly non-
proportional”  while  “logistic  models  are  only  slightly  less  proportional  than  the  extreme  value 
specification”.  The fact that extreme value and logistic estimation give very similar results is because, if h 
denotes the hazard rate, the odds ratios (the exponentiated coefficients of the logistic model) will tend, if 
the  hazard  is  sufficiently  small,  to  the  hazard  ratio  where  the  latter  corresponds  to  the  exponentiated 
coefficients of the extreme value model.  To check whether the coefficients of the extreme value and 
logistic model differ a lot, we estimated the model again with an extreme value distribution of the error 
terms.  However, coefficients and standard errors are very similar. The predicted hazard rates are barely 
distinguishable.    
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the  transition  equations.    In  a  model  that  allows  for  unobserved  heterogeneity,  an 
additional  problem  arises.    The  probability  that  the  first  non-left  censored  spell  is  a 
poverty  spell  will  depend  on  individual  characteristics  including  unobserved  effects, 
creating an initial conditions problem whereby the identity of the first complete spell we 
observe  is  endogenous.  To  control  for  the  selection  bias  that  may  arise  we  follow 
Heckmans(1981) approximation method and define a probability of being in a spell of 
type k at the initial year of observation as a function of individual characteristics and 
unobserved effects and we estimate this probability together with the transition equations 
while allowing the unobserved effect of the initial condition equation to be correlated 
with the unobserved effects of the transition equations.  To identify the model we use 
explanatory  variables  in  the  initial  condition  equation  that  are  excluded  from  the 














= where t=0 is used to denote the calendar year in which the first 
non-left  censored  poverty  spell  started,  0 i W ( it x ¹ )  is  a  vector  of  observable 
characteristics  and  q  corresponds  to  the  unobserved  effect.    If  we  denote  the  joint 
trivariate  distribution  of  the  random  unobserved  effects  by  ) , , ( q c c F
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likelihood function for the whole sample becomes: 
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where  1 = it p when the spell in t is a poverty spell (and 0 = it p otherwise) and if it is a 
non-poverty  spell,  1 = it np (and  0 = it np otherwise).   
p
i P 0   denotes  the  probability  of 
observing a  poverty spell in the first year of the observation.  In order that the sample 
likelihood can be estimated
43 a trivariate normal distribution with mean 0 is assumed for 
the unobserved effects.   
                                                 
43 The estimation requires nonlinear optimization methods.  The Newton-Raphson technique we used 
(within the PROC GLIMMIX procedure of SAS 9.2.) is a numerical algorithm to find the first-order and 
second order derivatives of a log-likelihood function.     24
 
One  can  test  the  ignorability  of  the  initial  condition  and  of  individual-specific  time-
constant effects on the basis of the correlations of the cross-equations error terms.  We 
write the covariances between the unobserved effects as: 




i c c = r  
) , cov( 2 q c
np
i = r  
) , cov( 3 q c
p
i = r  
Where  1 r summarizes the association between unobserved effects determining poverty 
exit  and  poverty  re-entry,  2 r the  association  between  unobserved  effects  determining 
poverty re-entry and initial poverty status and  3 r the association between unobserved 
effects  determining  poverty  exit  and  initial  poverty  status.    If  these  associations  are 
significant,  there  is  evidence  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  of  an  initial  condition 
problem.   
      
4.3. Results  
 
The  first  column  of  table  6  reports  the  estimates  for  separately  estimated  poverty 
transitions that do not control for unobserved heterogeneity nor for an initial condition 
problem.  The second column resumes the estimates from the joint estimation of exit and 
re-entry  rates allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity but not  for  the initial 
condition.  Including the latter as well leads to the estimates in the third column.  
 
When one wants to control for unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables may 
be time-varying, it is difficult to relax the requirement they should be strictly exogenous.   
Since  we  only  are  only  interested  in  the  coefficients  of  duration  dependence,  while 
controlling for all kind of observed and unobserved effects, we could not include all 
variables at our disposal and only included explanatory variables that can be justified as 
strictly  exogenous  such  as  age,  gender,  year
44.    We  also  consider  education  level 
                                                 
44AGE and YEAR are time-varying but can be treated essentially in the same way as time-invariant ones, as 
explained by Lancaster(1990, p.21).     25
(measured as primary, secondary or high school education) as exogenous for individuals 
that at the moment they are sampled approach retirement.  Being member of the second 
pillar is considered exogenous since in Belgium this decision is taken at latest at the age 
of 25 or at the start of the employment relationship and it is taken by the employer and 
external to the employed worker
45.  Finally, there are time-varying variables that may be 
exogenous or endogenous like employment status or household composition.  We tested 
for  their  exogeneity  by  regressing  employment  status  and  household  composition  on 
lagged poverty status.  Since this was significant, we conclude these are endogenous and 
excluded them
46. The right approach would be to estimate the two poverty transitions 
equations (and the initial condition equation) together with an equation for employment 
status and marital status
47 but this is an issue for future research.   
 
A practical difficulty concerns the choice of exclusion restrictions in the third column.  
The theoretical idea is clear: good exclusion restrictions should only affect the probability 
that the first spell of an individual that is selected is a poverty spell while it may have no 
effect on poverty transitions.  The empirical literature does however not provide a lot of 
guidance on this matter.  If a variable is used in the initial condition equation while it is 
excluded by the researcher from the transition equation although it would be significant 
in the transition equation, it would lead to measurement error.  Therefore, we tested 
explicitly whether the variables that were introduced in the initial condition equation 
were insignificant in the transition equation.  We dispose of the variable subjective 
reported health status that, if it could argued to be time-invariant, could be included as 
strictly exogenous instrument since it appeared to be strongly significant in the initial 
condition equation but not in the transition equations.  The common practice of all 
models on poverty dynamics that account for unobserved effects and dispose of a health 
                                                 
45 Since the law of 6
th april 1995, the decision to introduce an occupational pension scheme is the exclusive 
autority of the employer.  In addition, the age at which the employee becomes member of a scheme is at 
maximum 25 years old or at the start of the employment relationship. 
46 In contrast to VanKerm(2004), Makovec(2005), Capellari-Jenkins(2002), Capellari-Jenkins(2004), 
Capellari(1999), Arulumpalam-Booth-Taylor(1998), Nicaise-Deblander(2005), Hansen-Wahlberg(2004), 
Devicienti-Gualteri(2007), Andrèn(2007), Poggi(2007),… who include in a model with unobserved effects 
employment status and/or household composition and thus assume the latter are strictly exogenous. 
47 Biewen(2004) and Aasve et al.(2006) are up to now the only ones that estimate simultaneously 
employment status and household composition in a model of poverty dynamics.   26
variable is to assume that this is strictly exogenous: Jenkins (2002), Capellari-
Jenkins(2004), Meghir-Whitehouse(1997), Arulumpalam-Booth-Taylor(2000), Nicaise-
Deblander(2005).  Nonetheless, it is true that in the cited models health status is 
measured at the beginning of the sampling period while in our case it is measured at the 
end of the sampled period (in 2001).  If self-reported health status would not be time-
constant, it could be not strictly exogenous and lead to inconsistent estimates.  For our 
dataset, there is no way to test whether it is exogenous or endogenous.  Survey 
information
48 seems to indicate however that subjective reported health status is rather 
time-invariant.  To avoid discussion, we proxied self-reported health status by life 
expectancy measured in the first year of the sampling period 1991 by age, education level 
and gender
49.  This is strictly exogenous and has the advantage of containing more 
variability than the usual instrument that is the unemployment rate.  Finally, after also 
experimenting with growth rate of GDP, a year dummy for 1992 and combinations of 
instruments, the best fit and most significant results were obtained with unemployment 
rate and health expectancy of the head as instruments.   
Table 6: multiple-spell discrete-time hazard model with unobserved effects
50 





Without initial condition 
With heterogeneity 
with initial condition 
Exit 




































Duration 6 years  4.727**  4.879**  4.257** 
                                                 
48 Kington-Smith(1998): “Self-reported health status is not used to measure temporary health problems but 
to include general physical, social and emotional function.   Health in old age reflects one' s long-term 
health history. The study' s findings show that health status in advanced years is greatly influenced by a 
history of health that goes back to one' s childhood and reaches even beyond personal health status to 
include the health status of parents and siblings throughout their lives.” 
49 Deboosere-Gadeyne(2002). 
50 Since the sample consists of repeated observations on the same household, standard errors are adjusted to 
account for the dependence at the level of the household.    27
(0.29)  (0.30)  (0.30) 
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Duration 4 years  4.564**  4.873**  4.665**   28
(0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34) 
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Life expectancy head      -5.199** 
                                                 
51 The initial condition equation also includes all the explanatory variables in the poverty transition 
equations but these are not displayed to save space.     29
(1.33) 
Unemployment rate      21.605** 
(7.25) 
Covariance parameter estimates of unobserved effects 
 
1 r =-0.59 
(0.04) 
1 r =-0.95 
(0.05) 
2 r =0.105 (0.04) 
3 r =-0.035 (0.04) 
Formal likelihood ratio tests of significance of covariance parameter estimates  




1 c <0.0001 




1 c <0.0001 




1 c =0.05 




1 c =0.52 




1 c <0.0001 




1 c =0.17 




1 c <0.0001 
-2LogLikelihood  461013  459184  405304 
Number observations  72844  72844  72844 
* denotes significance at 5% level, ** denotes significance at 1% level; standard errors in parenthesis .The 
reference person is a male head with primary school education, no member of second pillar, living in Antwerp, 
with spouse with primary school education in 1992. Year and province dummies are included in all equations. 
 
We primarily compare the coefficients of duration dummies across the three scenarios.  
When  taking  into  account  unobserved  heterogeneity,  the  coefficients  become  larger.  
However the duration dummies remain strongly significant and decrease with duration 
suggesting a genuine causal effect of duration dependence.  The unobserved effects do 
not really change the coefficients of the individual characteristics what means that the 
unobserved effects are not correlated with the already included individual characteristics.  
As is typically the case, taking into account the sample selection bias, when going from 
the second to the third column, leads to a reduction of the estimated coefficients: the 
exogeneity hypothesis leads to overestimate both size and significance of the estimated 
coefficients. 
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Most of the individual characteristics that are significant, like education level, female 
head  and  membership  second  pillar,  have  opposite  signs  in  the  exit  and  re-entry 
equations.  As in VanKerm(2004), Capellari-Jenkins(2002) and Stewart-Swaffield(1999), 
the unobserved effects that lead to poverty exit are also decreasing poverty re-entry since 
1 r has a negative sign ( 1 r =-0.59) and is strongly significant.  This means that besides the 
observable characteristics that reduce exit and increase reentry there are also in addition 
unobserved effects that lead to the same kind of persistence in poverty.  This remains so 
if we take in addition the initial condition into account ( 1 r =-0.95).   
 
The positive sign of  2 r indicates that the unobserved effects that make that individuals 
are likely to be initially poor are also increasing the risk of poverty exit.  This sign is 
interpreted by Stewart-Swaffield(1999), Jenkins-Capellari(2002) and Capellari(1999) as 
follows:  given  that  it  measures  the  correlation  between  the  probability  of  having  a 
poverty transition and being initially poor, the negative sign is analogous to a negative 
coefficient  in  the  regression  of  poverty  transitions  on  poverty  status,  i.e.  Galtonian 
regression towards the mean.  Finally 3 r has a negative sign meaning that the unobserved 
effect that makes that individuals are likely to be initially poor are also decreasing the 
risk of poverty reentry but is not significant.     
 
A  formal  likelihood  ratio  test  of  significance  of  the  covariance  parameter  estimates 
confirmed that the model that allows for correlation between the unobserved effects is 
clearly  to  be  preferred  to  the  one  that  does  not,  what  we  interpret  as  evidence  of 
unobserved  heterogeneity  and  an  initial  condition  problem.    It  also  shows  that  the 
hypothesis that only  3 r =0 cannot be rejected.  
 
Up  to  now,  we  assumed  the  population  is  a  group  of  homogenous  individuals  and 
interpreted duration dependence as related to work disincentives, stigma or depreciation 
of human capital.  One might argue these arguments concern primarily those covered by 
the social security system of the employed while the mechanism behind the observed 
poverty among the self-employed may in addition be related to the non-declaration of   31
incomes.    To  check  whether  the  latter  mechanism  would  dominate  our  results,  we 
estimated the model separately for those who have been employed and those who have 
been self-employed.  Negative dependence in poverty remains a true phenomenon.   
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
The matching of the National Register with the Income Tax Returns and Census provided 
evidence  of  strong  income  mobility:  1)  Every  year  about  14%  of  the  Belgian  civil 
population is out of the Income Tax Returns, while only 4.9% of households do not 
appear for any year 1991-2002 in the Income Tax Returns; 2) 37% of the Belgian elderly 
experience poverty once over a period of 12 years what is much larger than the 12% of 
Belgian elderly that is poor in a given year. 
 
About 30% of those who become poor leave poverty already after one year and are only 
transitory poor.  The bulk of the elderly poor are however persistently poor.  The question 
arises whether this persistence in poverty is true or spurious.  The estimation of a multiple 
spell  discrete-time  hazard  model,  controlling  for unobserved  effects  and  a  significant 
initial condition problem, showed a genuine causal effect of duration dependence.  One 
does not know a lot of the mechanism that lies behind genuine persistence in poverty.  It 
has  been  suggested  that  persistence  may  be  due  to  depreciation  of  human  capital  or 
adverse work incentives.  The latter illustrates the poverty trap: people may be given a 
financial  incentive  not  to  work  while  at  the  same  time  they  slip  into  poverty.    This 
suggestion sounds reasonable since in Belgium elderly unemployed are exempted from 
the  search  for  a  job  and  thus  easily  exposed  to  depreciation  of  human  capital  and 
employers are reluctant to invest in the human capital of elderly workers.  In addition, in 
Belgium  both  employers  and  the  government  design  retirement  pathways  that  give 
elderly strong incentives to leave the labour market as soon as possible.   
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